{"server":{"name":"io.github.coderifts/api-governance","$schema":"https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-12-11/server.schema.json","remotes":[{"url":"https://app.coderifts.com/mcp","type":"streamable-http","headers":[{"name":"Authorization","isSecret":true,"description":"Bearer <API key from https://coderifts.com>. X-API-Key is also accepted."}]}],"version":"1.0.3","repository":{"url":"https://github.com/coderifts/api-governance","source":"github"},"websiteUrl":"https://coderifts.com","description":"Signed, offline-verifiable contract-change authorization. Only a granted change can proceed."},"_meta":{"io.modelcontextprotocol.registry/official":{"status":"active","isLatest":true,"updatedAt":"2026-09-20T16:13:26.452791Z","publishedAt":"2026-09-20T16:13:26.452791Z","statusChangedAt":"2026-09-20T16:13:26.452791Z"},"dev.protogrid/connectability":{"class":"R0","autonomous":true,"human_steps":[],"preferred":{"kind":"remote","idx":0},"remotes":[{"idx":0,"url":"https://app.coderifts.com/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","templated":false,"headers":[{"name":"Authorization","required":false,"secret":true,"value":null,"secret_names":["API_GOVERNANCE_TOKEN"]}],"auth":{"type":"none","location":null,"secret_name":null,"oauth":null},"protocol":{"supported_versions":["2025-06-18"],"stateless":true},"health":{"reachable":true,"uptime_30d":0.9369369,"latency_ms_p50":295,"consecutive_failures":0,"last_probe_at":"2026-10-20T01:02:20.080Z","last_ok_at":"2026-10-20T01:02:20.080Z"}}],"packages":[]},"dev.protogrid/tools":[{"name":"get_decision_details","title":null,"description":"Retrieve a PAST CodeRifts decision by exactly one identifier\n(case_id | decision_id | fingerprint): full report, breaking changes, scores,\nand linked receipt metadata if stored.\n\nUse this when:\n- You have a decision_id (or fingerprint) from a previous preflight, PR\n  comment, or CI log and need to inspect or explain that past decision.\n- You are auditing why a prior ALLOW/WARN/BLOCK was issued.\n- You are NOT requesting a new analysis of current before/after specs.\n\nDo not use when:\n- You need a decision for the CURRENT uncommitted or PR head change set —\n  call coderifts.preflight_change_set with the current artifacts.\n- You hold a receipt token and only need cryptographic/lifecycle verification —\n  use coderifts.verify_receipt.\n- You have no identifier — run preflight first to create one.\n\nInputs: exactly one of case_id, decision_id, or fingerprint. {} → INVALID_INPUT;\ntwo identifiers → LOOKUP_IDENTIFIER_CONFLICT; case_id → CASE_NOT_FOUND\n(lookup never opens a case). Returns the stored document or not_found.\n\nScoping — fingerprint lookup returns only YOUR OWN decisions. A fingerprint is\nderived from content, not from an account, so two callers who preflight\nbyte-identical specs derive the same one; the lookup is therefore constrained\nto the decisions your credential can prove it owns.\n\nA decision that exists but is not yours returns the SAME not_found as one that\nwas never issued. This is deliberate: a distinguishable \"exists but forbidden\"\nwould confirm to any caller that a given content hash had been decided on by\nsomeone, which is the fact the scoping exists to withhold. Do not read\nnot_found as proof that no such decision exists anywhere.\n\nDecisions persisted without context.repository cannot currently be attributed\nto an account, and are not retrievable by fingerprint at all — not by their\nowner either. Retrieve those by decision_id, which is unchanged and unscoped.\nThis is a limitation of what older stored rows carry, not a property of the\nlookup: rows written from now on record the account directly, so the gap\nnarrows as older rows age out. If a fingerprint you expect returns not_found,\nuse the decision_id before concluding the decision is missing.\n\nWhen the stored envelope carries control fields, control_envelope.next_agent_step\nis structured remediation guidance the agent MAY follow for non-CONTINUE\nexecution_action values (null on CONTINUE*). Still branch on execution_action;\nnext_agent_step is a suggestion, not permission.","annotations":{"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false},"source":"probe","observed_at":"2026-10-20T01:02:20.080Z"},{"name":"preflight_change_set","title":null,"description":"Use this when: a contract artifact (OpenAPI, GraphQL, protobuf, AsyncAPI, MCP manifests, or agent tool schemas) changes before merge, deploy, publish, or tool registration; AND any agent-executed operation with no supported contract type — send type agent_operation. Do not call for documentation-only changes, static readiness scoring, or receipt verification. Use analyze for risk only; authorize requires context.operation. Skipping this call is not permission. Absence of a key is not permission. Inputs: preflight_mode is required: \"analyze\" (risk only; no receipt, no execution_action) or \"authorize\" (may mint a receipt; requires context.operation — merge is not deploy is not publish). Supply exactly one artifact source: artifacts[] (1–20 items, each {id, type, before, after} as the FULL spec/schema text, not a path or URL; type is openapi|graphql|grpc|asyncapi|mcp_manifest|agent_tools|agent_operation) XOR derivation=\"server\" (server reads GitHub Compare; needs context.repository + context.base + context.head; sending artifacts[] together is 400). Grant fields sit in one object, execution_grant_request {include_execution_grant, grant_version, tenant_id, executor_id, adapter_id, target_uri, expected_state_token, state_nonce, audience, policy_hash}; analyze ignores it; required is preflight_mode only. previous_receipt is a chain token base64url(body).base64url(signature) to LINK a prior decision — it does not re-verify; use coderifts.verify_receipt instead; for details of a past decision use coderifts.get_decision_details instead. idempotency_key replays authorize only (24h), never analyze.","annotations":{"readOnlyHint":false,"openWorldHint":false},"source":"probe","observed_at":"2026-10-20T01:02:20.080Z"},{"name":"verify_receipt","title":null,"description":"Verify a CodeRifts signed chain-receipt you ALREADY HOLD: cryptographic\nauthenticity (signature + key id), body binding, and — when lifecycle indices\nare available — whether it is currently valid authorization (not expired,\nsuperseded, or revoked) for a stated operation/target.\n\nUse this when:\n- You already obtained a chain_receipt / receipt token from a prior preflight\n  (or CI artifact) and are about to act (merge/deploy) under that receipt.\n- A contract-gate or policy requires offline/online proof that the receipt is\n  authentic for this change before proceeding.\n- You must distinguish \"signature ok\" from \"currently authorized\" (stale or\n  superseded receipts must not be treated as live approval).\n\nDo not use when:\n- You do not have a receipt yet — call coderifts.preflight_change_set first.\n- You need a NEW decision for a changed base→head set — preflight again;\n  verify_receipt does not re-diff specs.\n- The receipt you hold binds a different operation or target than the one you\n  are about to perform — call coderifts.preflight_change_set with\n  context.operation set to that operation (a merge receipt does not authorize\n  a deploy); verify_receipt cannot re-scope or re-issue a decision.\n- You only need human-readable history of an old decision_id without a receipt\n  token — use coderifts.get_decision_details.\n- The change set itself is unknown or incomplete — fix the change set and\n  preflight; do not \"verify\" a placeholder.\n\nInputs: receipt token (required); target_id = decision_result.artifact_digest — required\nfor an authorization verdict; omitted → target_not_stated. Optional intended context\n(operation, environment, fingerprint, audience, repository/branch/pull_request, base/head)\nand the body_hash-bound decision_result envelope. 30s clock-skew leeway on expiry. A 0s\ngrace for declared destructive production operations is defined in the policy but\nis unreachable today: the intended-context schema has no destructive field, so\nnothing can declare one and the 30s leeway always applies.\nReturns { valid, status, currently_authorized (bool|null), reason, payload, authz_* }.\nBranch on currently_authorized; null = not evaluated.\n\nWhen a decision envelope is also in hand (e.g. from a prior preflight), its\ncontrol_envelope.next_agent_step (if present) is structured remediation guidance\nthe agent MAY follow after a non-CONTINUE decision — still branch on\nexecution_action; next_agent_step is suggestion, not permission.","annotations":{"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false},"source":"probe","observed_at":"2026-10-20T01:02:20.080Z"}],"dev.protogrid/trust":{"score":96,"components":{"hygiene":100,"liveness":97,"freshness":100,"provenance":90},"drivers":["+repository","+namespace-matches-repo","+website","+reachable","+uptime-94%","+updated-29d-ago"],"flags":[],"blocked":false,"computed_at":"2026-10-20T01:09:23.032Z","disclaimer":"Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed."},"dev.protogrid/quality":{"score":82,"label":"good","components":{"auth":null,"hygiene":79,"protocol":75,"stability":100,"dependencies":null},"checks":[{"id":"protocol.modern","detail":"newest supported version is 2025-06-18; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28","status":"warn","category":"protocol"},{"id":"protocol.stateless","detail":"only applies to 2026-07-28 servers","status":"na","category":"protocol"},{"id":"protocol.transport","detail":"streamable HTTP","status":"pass","category":"protocol"},{"id":"protocol.list_ttl","detail":"only applies to 2026-07-28 servers","status":"na","category":"protocol"},{"id":"auth.prm","detail":"no remote uses OAuth","status":"na","category":"auth"},{"id":"auth.as_metadata","detail":"no remote uses OAuth","status":"na","category":"auth"},{"id":"auth.cimd","detail":"no remote uses OAuth","status":"na","category":"auth"},{"id":"auth.secret_in_url","detail":"no templated URL","status":"na","category":"auth"},{"id":"tools.descriptions","detail":"every tool has a description","status":"pass","category":"hygiene"},{"id":"tools.description_length","detail":"3 tools have descriptions over 1,024 characters, which crowds the context","status":"warn","category":"hygiene"},{"id":"tools.schemas","detail":"every tool has an object input schema","status":"pass","category":"hygiene"},{"id":"tools.annotations","detail":"3 of 3 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint","status":"pass","category":"hygiene"},{"id":"tools.directory_hints","detail":"no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: verify_receipt (destructiveHint, idempotentHint); get_decision_details (destructiveHint, idempotentHint); preflight_change_set (destructiveHint, idempotentHint)","status":"fail","category":"hygiene"},{"id":"tools.token_cost","detail":"about 5,234 tokens to load every tool","status":"pass","category":"hygiene"},{"id":"tools.api_dump","detail":"tools are not a one-to-one API dump","status":"pass","category":"hygiene"},{"id":"stability.changes","detail":"5 tool changes in 30 days","status":"pass","category":"stability"},{"id":"stability.rug_pull","detail":"no tool changed its meaning under the same name","status":"pass","category":"stability"},{"id":"deps.known_vulns","detail":"no npm or PyPI package","status":"na","category":"dependencies"},{"id":"deps.mcp_sdk_version","detail":"no npm or PyPI package","status":"na","category":"dependencies"},{"id":"deps.resolvable","detail":"no npm or PyPI package","status":"na","category":"dependencies"}],"drivers":["-tools.directory_hints","~protocol.modern","~tools.description_length"],"flags":[],"tool_count":3,"token_estimate":5234,"tools_hash":"d64f89bafdff074c557a8fd1d8b05b86","tools_changed_at":"2026-09-26T20:09:09.394Z","computed_at":"2026-10-20T00:54:40.254Z","disclaimer":"Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed."},"dev.protogrid/identity":{"canonical_id":"io.github.coderifts/api-governance","aliases":[],"alias_count":0,"repository_key":"github:coderifts/api-governance","owner":{"verified":false,"method":null,"since":null}}},"next_actions":[{"action":"list_tools","description":"Every current tool with input schemas","href":"/v1/servers/io.github.coderifts%2Fapi-governance/tools","arguments":{"name":"io.github.coderifts/api-governance"}},{"action":"get_connection","description":"Minimal connection block for the preferred remote or package","href":"/v1/servers/io.github.coderifts%2Fapi-governance/connection?target=mcpServers","arguments":{"name":"io.github.coderifts/api-governance","target":"mcpServers"}},{"action":"search","description":"Find other servers by intent","href":"/v1/search?q={query}","arguments":{"q":"{query}"}}]}